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Abstract
This paper deals with the compensation for non–fatal accident risk in Switzerland and
presents empirical estimates of the value of a statistical injury. We approach the problem
of endogenous sorting of workers into jobs with different accident risks based on unobserved
productivity differences twofold. First, we have access to the number of accidents not only
at the level of industries, but within cells defined over industry×skill–level of the job, which
allows us to estimate risk compensation within groups of workers defined over the same
cells. Second, we capitalize on the partial panel structure of our data which allows us to
empirically isolate the wage component specific to the employer. Our different approaches
to identification in fact yield very different estimates of the value of a statistical injury. Our
preferred estimate gives an estimate of about 40,000 Swiss francs (per prevented injury per
year).
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1 Introduction
It has long been recognized in economics that differences in wages are not only due to the fact
that individuals differ in their productivity–relevant characteristics (e.g. education), but also
due to the fact that the jobs offered to workers differ enormously along various dimensions
(workplace safety being only one important example). Workers presumably not only value the
monetary payoff from working, but also the non–monetary characteristics, potentially giving
rise to compensating wage differentials (Rosen, 1986). This means firms offering jobs with
”negative” characteristics, that is, attributes to which workers attach a negative value, must
attract workers by paying them higher wages ceteris paribus, thus ”compensating” them for
the negative aspects of the job (and vice versa for ”positive” workplace characteristics). Non–
monetary characteristics of jobs are of course manifold, most empirical studies though focus
on workplace safety, that is on the risk compensation for both fatal and non–fatal accidents
(e.g. Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).
The theory of compensating wage differentials has inspired a huge number of empirical
studies trying to pin down the compensation for undesirable workplace attributes. Due to the
implicit trade–off between job amenities and wages, observed (or rather, estimated) compensat-
ing wage differentials can be used to assess the value of a statistical life or injury, respectively.
These empirical results in turn may directly influence public policy, since cost–benefit anal-
yses with respect to safety regulations need empirical assessments on the monetary value of
such regulations (this applies not only to regulations of safety at the workplace, but also to
environmental regulations for example).
Yet, the intuitive appeal of the theory notwithstanding, empirical studies face some funda-
mental problems concerning the identification of compensating wage differentials. The main
problem is rooted in unobserved productivity differences between individuals and the there-
upon based sorting of workers into jobs with different risks (due to the positive income elasticity
of the value of a statistical accident). This presumably explains the rather large variation in
the estimated compensation for risks on the one hand, but also the fact that many empirical
studies report no compensation for risk or even report compensating wage differentials having
the ”wrong” sign (at least with respect to non–fatal injury risks). For example, the survey by
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) reports a rather wide range of estimates for the value of a statistical
injury from about $20,000 to $70,000 (for the United States only).
This chapter presents empirical evidence on the compensation for non–fatal accident risk
in Switzerland, using a data set compiled from two different sources (which we will discuss
in detail below). Our study has three main features. First, we will exclusively focus on
non–fatal accidents. This focus reflects the fact that most accidents have (fortunately) non–
fatal consequences and thus, from the viewpoint of public health and safety, merit the most
attention.1 In the year 2004 (the year of our empirical analysis), for example, the Swiss
Accident Insurance Fund reports about 246,000 non–fatal accidents related to work but only
1Our focus though is also due to the available data on non–fatal accidents as well as the empirical approach
we take, as we will discuss in detail in section 3 and section 4 below.
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188 fatal accidents. Second, we observe the number of non–fatal accidents not only within
entire industries, but also within cells defined by industry×skill–level of the job. This is a
tremendous advantage from an empirical point of view, since risks at (too) high levels of
aggregation mix the risks of very different groups of workers and different willingness to pay
for avoiding risk, which might lead to biased estimation of the compensation for risk in the
workplace. Third, we capitalize on the availability of longitudinal wage information, which
allows us to use simple panel estimation methods in order to isolate the firm wage component.
We believe that our empirical approach, on the one hand using the number of non–fatal
accidents within narrower cells than usually available, and on the other hand combining panel
data estimation methods with simple non–parametric stratification, transcends the typical
hedonic wage function approach often used in the literature on the subject.
The main findings of our empirical analysis are the following. First, we find that a simple
hedonic wage regression, where the observed log wage is regressed on the risk measure (and
additional control variables) yields a compensation for non–fatal accident risk which is statisti-
cally zero, a result that is in line with some previous empirical studies. The leading explanation
for this result (which runs counter to theory) is presumably the sorting of workers which differ
in their unobserved productivity. Second, moving on to, in a sense, more sophisticated (but,
we believe, in this case also more reliable) methods, we find a positive point estimate for the
compensation of non–fatal accident risk. Our preferred point estimate yields an implicit value
of a statistical injury of about 40,000 Swiss francs (which lies well within the range given by
studies from the U.S. labor market, as well as from studies outside the U.S.). On the other
hand, using different estimation methods yields considerably different values for the value of a
statistical injury. As we will discuss later, a significant cause of this wide range of estimates
is the difference in the estimation methods used. Third, comparing the different estimation
methods may shed some light on the problem of endogenous sorting of workers into jobs with
different risks, which presumably yields biased estimates for the compensation of risk. Our
results are in fact in line with the argument supported by Hwang et al. (1992), among others,
that such endogenous sorting gives rise to severe underestimation of risk compensation. Fourth,
we find significant differences between men and women on the one hand, and between smaller
and larger firms on the other hand with respect to the compensation of non–fatal accident
risk. Fifth and finally, our results also show that the kind of risk–data available can make an
important difference for the empirical assessment of risk compensation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We start with a discussion of the relevant
literature on compensating wage differentials, focusing on empirical studies estimating the
compensation for non–fatal accident risk. In section 3, we discuss the two data sources we rely
on, discuss the construction of the variables of main interest – along with some descriptive
statistics. We then expore issues of identification and estimation in section 4. Specifically,
we will discuss three different approaches to identification and estimation. We start with a
simple hedonic wage regression model, where the wage is simply regressed on individual– and
firm–specific characteristics. The second approach is based on the idea that we can control
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for unobserved heterogeneity of individuals by appropriately stratifying the sample. The third
approach we take capitalizes on the longitudinal structure of the wage data. We isolate the
wage component, which is specific to the firm and then use only this part of the wage to
estimate risk compensation. The results of the different estimation methods are presented and
discussed in section 4. Based on our econometric results, we further present estimates of the
value of a statistical (non–fatal) accident in Switzerland. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is a large number of empirical studies which try to pin down the compensation for
accident risks, as well as for a wide range of other job amenities and disamenities (the surveys
by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and Viscusi (1993) are of special interest here; see also the more
recent, but less thorough survey by Ashenfelter (2006)).2 Most empirical studies find a positive
compensation for fatal accident risk, often yielding high implicit values of a statistical life. For
example, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) report that half of the studies from the U.S. labor market
surveyed in their article give a value of a statistical life within the range of $3.8–$9.0 million
(in 2000 dollars), the median estimate being about $7 million. Most studies from outside the
U.S. labor market give estimates within the same range. It is difficult to assess the exact
reasons for this wide range of estimates, since the studies differ in various ways, for example
with respect to the available data and risk measure3, or in the econometric methods applied.
The evidence on the compensation for non–fatal accident risk is much less coherent, which is
somewhat surprising since most studies that present estimates of such compensation are based
on the same data as estimates for the compensation for fatal accident risk. Viscusi and Aldy
(2003) report, for both the U.S. as well as other labor markets, a probable range for the value
of a statistical injury of about $20,000–$70,000 per injury.
The main problem from the empirical point of view is the potential sorting of workers
into jobs differing in their risk of accidents. Hwang et al. (1992), among others, argue that
the problem of main concern are differences in unobservables which in turn relate to the
productivity of workers and thus may lead to sorting of workers into jobs with different risks.
The sorting of workers in turn is endogenous due to the fact that the income elasticity of the
value of a statistical life or injury is positive, i.e. more productive workers sort themselves
into less risky jobs by accepting ceteris paribus lower wages. Viscusi and Aldy (2003), for
example, report an income elasticity of about 0.5–0.6. On the other hand though, Shogren and
Stamland (2002) argue that the bias in estimating the compensating wage differential could
2Compensating wage differentials have also been found, for example, for the risk of unemployment (Lalive
et al., 2006; Moretti, 2000), for shift work (Kostiuk, 1990), and uncertainty with respect to future earnings
(Feinberg, 1981).
3Most importantly perhaps, some studies rely not on direct measures of risk (i.e. number of accidents), but
base their analyses on tradeoffs outside the labor market, e.g. on the tradeoff between traffic accidents and the
price of automobiles (Dreyfus and Viscusi, 1995) or fatalities related to bicycle accidents and the prize of bicycle
helmets (Jenkins et al., 2001). Other studies have used subjective assessments of risk, as for example Viscusi
and O’Connor (1984) and Viscusi and Hersch (2001).
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run in the other direction, assuming that workers not only differ in their productivity, but also
with respect to their skill in avoiding accidents. Thus, workers in risky jobs could be either
more tolerant to risk or more skilled in avoiding risk (or both). Thus they show that the
estimated risk compensation might actually be upward biased, rather than downward biased.
Some studies have tried to approach the problem of endogenous sorting by using instrumental
variables (DeLeire and Levy, 2004; Garen, 1988, for example,). The study by Garen (1988),
for example, tries to correct for the endogeneity of job risk by using a system of simultaneous
equations where marital status and the number of dependents are used as instruments for the
preference over risk.
Another empirical issue concerns the measurement of the risk of an accident. First, as
pointed out by Mellow and Sider (1983) for example, typical survey data are more often than
not plagued by measurement error, i.e. it seems to be the case that workers often misreport
their industry affiliation and/or their exact occupation. Assuming that this kind of measure-
ment error is random, this causes the compensating differential to be biased towards zero.
Second, there clearly is a trade–off of the following form. On the one hand, risk measurements
at a low level of aggregation are preferred, as otherwise one might mix workers with very
different occupations into the same risk categories. On the other hand though, risk measures
at a low aggregation level run into the problem that many cells will have zero risk, at least
for shorter periods of time. This is specifically true for fatal accident risk, yet obviously also
applies to non–fatal injuries.
The most prevalent approach in the empirical literature is via estimation of hedonic wage
functions, that is, by running regressions of the wage on characteristics of both the workers and
jobs. As we will make explicit in section 4, this approach is likely to fail identification because
it is unlikely that this approach can effectively deal with the problem of endogenous sorting
of workers into jobs (as pointed out above, some studies have tried to instrument endogenous
sorting by using family characteristics). As we will discuss in detail in section 4 below, our
empirical approach of choice relies on the panel structure of the wage data. Thus, our study
also relates to work on matched employer–employee data (e.g. Abowd and Kramarz, 1999)
as well as the panel data estimation methods in general (e.g. Wooldridge, 2002). We cannot
directly apply the methods of Abowd and Kramarz (1999) though, because our wage data
has a longitudinal structure only with respect to the employer, but not with respect to the
individual worker.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only a single published study on the compensation of
accident risk for Switzerland by Baranzini and Ferro-Luzzi (2001), focusing on fatal accident
risk only. They report estimates for the value of a statistical life ranging from about 12 to
about 32 million Swiss francs. Besides having a different focus (our focus in on non–fatal
accident risk only), our study differs in at least two further ways. First, we have access
to the number of non–fatal accidents not only within industries, but within narrower cells,
defined over industry×skill–level of the job. Second, we do not primarily and exclusively rely
on simple hedonic wage regressions for the estimation of risk compensation, instead we use
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the longitudinal structure of the wage information in a first stage in order to deal with the
endogenous sorting of workers.
3 Data
3.1 Data Sources
We use two different data sources. The first data source is the Swiss Wage Structure Sur-
vey (SWSS; ”Lohnstrukturerhebung (LSE)”), which is a biannual survey among firms which
is administered and made available by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. The SWSS is
one of the two largest official surveys in Switzerland focused mainly on employment–relevant
information.4 The SWSS is a survey of firms, covering the population of large firms along
with a random sample of small firms. We use three different waves of the SWSS (from the
years 2000, 2002, and 2004) and we extract individual monthly earnings along with several
individual–specific characteristics (see section 3.4 below) on details.
Our risk measure corresponds to the number of non–fatal accidents within cells defined
over industry (forty different industries on a two–digit level) and skill–level of the job (four
different levels). The data have been provided by the Swiss Accident Insurance Fund (SAIF;
”Schweizerische Unfallversicherungsanstalt (Suva)”), which is the most important accident
insurance fund in Switzerland. The number of non–fatal accidents within industry×skill–level
cells are available for the year 2004.
3.2 Definitions
One of the main features of our analysis is that our risk measure rk gives the number of
non–fatal accidents per year and per 1,000 workers within a given industry×skill–level cell k
(instead of within–industry only). Data on the absolute number of non–fatal accidents for the
year 2004 is available within cells defined over industry×skill–level of job. Now, because the
SAIF does not directly have the number of workers within these cells and because workers are
not uniformly distributed over these cells, we also need to know the distribution of workers
over these cells in order to compute the risk of a non–fatal accident. To this end, we simply
use the distribution of workers in the SWSS (from the year 2004), and then approximate the
population distribution of workers by multiplying the number of workers within a given cell
with the total number of workers which are covered by the SAIF (about 1.827 millions in the
year 2004).
Note that there is a fundamental trade–off with respect to the risk measure chosen: On
the one hand, risk measures on a highly disaggregated level are preferred, such that we do
4The second important labor market survey is the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS; ”Schweizerische Ar-
beitskra¨fteerhebung (SAKE)”). The two main advantages of using the SWSS over the SLFS are the following:
First, the SWSS allows isolating the wage firm fixed effect, which is the part of the observed wage where risk
compensation should show up. Second, the SWSS is (opposed to the SLFS) mailed to employers, and thus
misclassification of occupations and industries should only be of minimal order (the same is arguably true for
wages).
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not pool accident risks of individuals working in very different occupations and jobs. This has
been pointed at, for example, by Viscusi (1993, p.1928), noting that ”[t]he main deficiency
of industry–based data is that they pertain to industry–wide averages and do not distinguish
among the different jobs within that industry [...]”. On the other hand, accidents observed at
a very low level of aggregation also give rise to estimation problems, because the number of
accidents tends towards zero for most cells if we shrink the size of the risk–relevant cells. That,
in fact, is the reason why we decided not to use the information about fatal accidents for this
study. Disaggregating the number of fatal accidents over the skill–level of job actually yields
far too many cells with zero number of accidents.
The SWSS includes average gross monthly wages for full–time employment (i.e. 172 hours
per month), including mandatory social security contributions and extra pay (e.g. for night
work, 13. monthly wage). The SWSS also includes several socio–demographic characteristics
(e.g. age, gender, tenure, educational attainment (highest degree), citizenship), but also dif-
ferent firm characteristics (most importantly, the size of the firm along with the geographic
location).
3.3 Measurement Error
One main advantage of our data is that measurement error in the risk data and industry–
affiliation of workers is arguably of minor significance (as already mentioned in section 2,
Mellow and Sider (1983) have pointed out the problem of misclassification of both industry
and occupation). This is important because measurement error in the risk variable tends to
bias the compensating wage differential towards zero (measurement error in the dependent
variable (i.e. wage) is, of course, also common but of less concern). We are confident that the
measurement error for both our risk measure and industry–affiliation is of no great importance,
since the SWSS does not involve employees but obtains the data from the employer directly
(such that misclassification of either industry and/or occupation is unlikely to occur). For the
same reason, we also believe that our wage information is more reliable than the information
available in typical survey data (although presumably less reliable than administrative data).
Additionally, our risk measure is directly obtained from administrative sources and should thus
cover all relevant accidents.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for both the overall sample as well as the sample of individ-
uals in jobs of the lowest skill–level (that will be used in the empirical analysis discussed below).
In both samples, we only consider workers aged between 16 and 64 (for men) and between 16
and 61 (for women). A second restriction applies to the size of the employer. Because we are
estimating wage fixed effects for each firm, we also restrict the sample to workers from firms
which have at least ten workers in each of the four job skill–levels in each year. The overall
sample includes more than one million individual workers, the subsample of workers in the
lowest skill–level (with respect to the job, not with respect to the educational attainment of
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the worker) consists of about 300,000 individual workers. In both cases, there are about 3,500
different firms (due to the restriction on firms). As we will discuss in–depth in section 4 below,
our preferred estimation approach will focus exclusively on workers within a given skill–level
as collected in the SWSS, as we believe that such a stratification of the workers yields more
reliable estimates of the compensating wage differential.
We begin with describing the overall sample, which is representative of the Swiss labor
market as a whole. The typical worker in the Swiss labor market has gross earnings equal to
6,300 Swiss francs a month, is about 40 years old and has about 9.5 years of tenure and is more
likely to be a man. The average employer has more than 2,800 workers (reflecting the sampling
structure of the SWSS as well as the restriction with respect to the selection of the employers).
About two thirds of the workers are married, the other third single. The distribution of workers
with respect to educational attainment highlights two important characteristics of the Swiss
labor market in terms of education. First, compared to other countries, the number of workers
with tertiary education is rather low (e.g. only about 5.5% of the workers have a university
degree). Second, about half of the workers hold a vocational training. Another important
characteristic of the Swiss labor market is the large fraction (about 20%) of workers without
Swiss citizenship.
Table 1 about here
Focusing on individuals working in jobs with the lowest skill–level (columns 3 and 4 of table
1) yields the expected result that some groups are overrepresented in the analysis sample
relative to the overall sample of individuals (although this subset of individuals is similar
to the overall sample with respect to some characteristics, for example age and size or the
geographic location of the employer).5 Here, average monthly earnings are only about 70%
of the overall average earnings (about 4,500 Swiss francs). Moreover, a worker from skill–
level four is more likely to be a woman, more likely to be married and much more likely
not to have Swiss citizenship, compared with a worker from the overall sample. The most
striking difference between the overall sample and the lowest skill–level sample though is the
distribution of workers with respect to educational attainment. As table 1 shows, there are
practically no workers with an educational degree above vocational training. This, in fact, is a
desired result with respect to the empirical approach we take (see section 4 below): Given that
education (of course not exclusively) reflects differences in productivity, focusing on workers
with similar educational attainment also implies that these workers are more similar with
respect to unobserved productivity–relevant characteristics (compared to workers from all job
skill–levels). We believe that the variance of unobserved productivity is presumably lowest
within the group of workers in the lowest skill–level (although this presumption obviously is
fundamentally empirically untestable).
5The distribution of workers over the skill–level of jobs looks as follows: About 6% work in the highest level,
about 20% in the second–highest level. 46% work in skill–level 3, and the remaining 28% of the workers are in
jobs of lowest skill–level.
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As table 1 also shows, the typical worker in the year 2004 was faced with the risk of a non–
fatal, work–related accident of about 8.8% (88 accidents on average per 1,000 workers). In the
sample of workers with lowest skill–level, the average risk was about half (about 43 accidents
per 1,000 workers). Figure 1 shows a simple scatterplot between the average logarithmic
monthly wage and the number of non–fatal accidents for workers from the lowest skill–level
jobs at the level of industry×skill–level. The scatterplot shows no relation whatsoever between
the two variables (if anything, the correlation goes the ”wrong” way), which is underlined by
the estimated slope coefficient from a regression of the average log earnings on the number of
accidents – yielding essentially a zero point estimate, both in economic and statistical terms
(t–value is approximately zero).
Figure 1 about here
This result is not especially surprising though since average wages within industries clearly
may not only reflect differences with respect to accident risks, but also differences in the com-
position of workers and jobs. We thus now move on to issues of identification and econometric
estimation.
4 Identification and Estimation
We now discuss issues of identification and estimation of the compensating wage differential
for (non–fatal) accident risk. We start with a simple hedonic wage regression of the following
form:
yijk = α+ x′iβ + z
′
jγ + δrk + uijk (1)
Where yijk is the natural logarithm of the gross monthly wage of individual i, working in firm
j and industry×skill–level cell k. x is a (column) vector of individual characteristics including
citizenship, educational attainment, age (and its square), tenure (and its square), a gender–
dummy and marital status. z is a (column) vector of characteristics describing the firm (and
thus reflecting the characteristics of the job), and includes the size of the firm (and its square)
and the geographical location of the firm. r is our risk measure, corresponding to the number
of non–fatal accidents in industry×skill–level cell k per 1,000 workers in the year 2004. uijk
is the unobserved error term, upon which identification of the compensating wage differential
obviously critically hinges.
α, β, γ and δ are parameters to be estimated from the sample data at hand. The con-
stant term α is, of course, of no special interest but simply serves the purpose of scaling the
expected value of the error term to zero. The two parameter vectors β and γ are also, for
the purpose of our analysis, of no particular interest. The parameter of main interest is δ,
which, under appropriate assumptions, corresponds to the compensating wage differential for
non–fatal accident risk.
As explained in section 3, the number of non–fatal accidents is only available for a single
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point in time, so that we can essentially only run a cross–sectional hedonic wage regression6
(but we do have a partial panel structure with respect to wages, which we will try to capitalize
on later; see section 4.4 below).
4.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity and Worker Sorting
Parameter δ (as are the other parameters) is identified if we are willing to assume that:
E(u|x, z, r) = E(u) (2)
This means, if we can safely assume that the error term uijk is mean independent of (x, z, r),
then all the parameters of the regression given by equation (1) are identified. However, as has
been pointed out by several authors (e.g. Hwang et al., 1992) and discussed in section 2, there is
good reason to act on the assumption that there is unobserved individual heterogeneity related
to wages (that is, these differences somehow reflect differences in productivity not taken into
account for by observed variables) and that ”safety” is a normal good (i.e. the demand for
”safety” increases as income rises). Thus, workers of high productivity sort themselves into
less risky jobs by accepting lower wages ceteris paribus. To stick with the model from equation
(1), the hedonic wage regression with unobserved individual heterogeneity made explicit can
be written as:
yijk = α+ x′iβ + z
′
jγ + δrk + θi + ijk (3)
where (θi + ijk) corresponds to the error term uijk in equation (1) whereby now we make the
problem of individual heterogeneity explicit (for simplicity, θ is rescaled such that the partial
of effect of θ on y is equal to 1).7 Now, even if we can assume that ijk is mean independent of
(x, z, r), identification of the compensating wage differential δ is only achieved if the unobserved
effect θ is also mean independent of (x, z, r). Whenever there is reason to believe otherwise,
parameter δ is not identified (and neither are the other parameters identified, but that is of
minor importance for our purposes, since we are not per se interested in these parameters).
As discussed in section 2, the leading reason for a correlation between θ and the accident
risk r is that θ reflects unobserved productivity, which is obviously related to the wage y. If
the demand for safety actually increases with income and if we are, at the same time, unable
to adequately control for productivity differences, then this could quite plausibly lead to a
correlation between θ and r. That is, more productive workers (i.e. workers with above–
average θ) sort themselves into less–risky jobs by accepting lower wages, which in turn leads
6Many, if not most, other empirical studies face the same problem of not observing the relevant risk measure
over time, as pointed out by Hwang et al.: ”While studies of this sort [i.e. panel studies] represent improvements
over standard cross–sectional studies, their applicability is restricted by the availability of longitudinal data sets
that include the relevant nonwage job attribute variables. In most cases, this is a binding constraint.” (Hwang
et al., 1992, p. 836).
7Note that the error term ijk potentially also includes unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the firm.
We will take up this issue in section 4.4 below.
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to a correlation between the productivity measure θ and the risk measure r, meaning that
identification of the risk compensation parameter δ must ultimately fail.
In the following, we will discuss three different empirical approaches in turn, all of which
are intended to mitigate the worker–sorting leading to biased estimates of the compensation
for risk.
4.2 Control Function
The first approach, which we might label control–function approach, is to basically stick with
the hedonic wage regression, but to try to control for as many observable characteristics (both
at the individual and the firm/job level) as possible. In fact, controlling for the appropriate set
of observed variables might entail identification of δ, depending on which variables are observed,
and thus can be controlled for in the regression model. Under ’typical’ circumstances however,
this approach is prone to fail identification, since the data sources usually available do not
include enough control variables or the critical control variables, respectively. Nonetheless, we
will also estimate hedonic wage regressions, mainly for reasons of comparison. We stress here
that we would not place much confidence in the resulting estimates for the parameter δ. The
bottom line is that this approach to identification crucially hinges on the availability of enough
control variables (describing both the workers and the jobs).
4.3 Sample Stratification
A second related approach is to stratify the sample in such a way as to minimize the variation
in the unobserved error component θ (see equation (3)). That is, we run the very same hedonic
wage regression as given by equation (1), but only on a narrow subset of individuals. Ideally,
this subset consists of individuals presumably as similar as possible with respect to θ. That
is, stratification is the simple non–parametric counterpart of the control function approach.
However, since most often it is very difficult to control for θ, we think that stratifying the
sample is probably a more fruitful approach.
Our stratification variable of primary interest is the skill–level of the job, which is recorded
in the SWSS. Let sij ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} be the skill–level of individual i working in job j, where
s = 1 (s = 4) corresponds to the highest (lowest) skill–level of a given job. We thus run the
same hedonic wage regression as in equation (1), but only on a subset of individuals within a
given skill–level s. Specifically, we will run the following regressions:
yijk = α+ x′iβ + z
′
jγ + δrk + uijk sij ≥ s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (4)
Note that this approach to estimation is basically the same as the control function approach,
the main difference being that stratification allows all parameter estimates to vary between
different subsets of the sample8. However, we think it plausible that the main advantage of
8That is, the control function approach yields the same estimates as sample stratification if all parameters
would be interacted with the variable on which stratification is based on. However, such a fully interacted
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the stratification is that we can minimize variation in θ in this way, which ideally renders a
consistent estimate of the compensating wage differential δ.9
4.4 Wage Decomposition and Firm Wage–Component
Our third approach to identification and estimation is based on quite another idea, which
tries to capitalize on the availability of panel data (with respect to the firm).10 Still, we can
use the additional source of variation in wages stemming from the fact that the SWSS has a
longitudinal structure (at least with respect to the firm) such that we can apply simple panel
data methods (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2002).
To start with, let us assume that the observed natural logarithm of the wage yit of individual
i in a given year t can (conceptually) be decomposed in a linear model as follows:
yijt = λt + φi + ψj + ijt (5)
Abstracting from the time fixed–effect λt, equation (5) states that individual i’s wage is the
sum of an individual wage fixed–effect φi, a firm wage fixed–effect ψj , and a remaining random
error component ijt. The critical assumptions in this simple linear fixed effects model are
the assumptions about the time invariance of both the individual and the firm fixed effect.
However, since we are using panel data spanning only a short time period we believe that
these assumptions are innocuous for our application – nonetheless allowing us to resort to
the power of panel data methods. Importantly, note that the theory of compensating wage
differentials essentially makes statements about the wage component specific to the employer
(i.e. ψj), but not to the individual–specific part nor the random part of the wage.
This simple representation of the wage essentially states that the wage of a specific indi-
vidual i in a given year t is the sum of an aggregate time effect (e.g. aggregate shocks), an
individual–specific component (which is assumed to be time–invariant), a firm–specific part
(also assumed to be time–invariant) and a random error term (varying over time, firms, and
individuals). If it is possible to consistently estimate the wage firm fixed effect ψj from the
available data, we can essentially get rid of individual heterogeneity by simply running a he-
donic wage regressing using the estimated wage firm–fixed effect ψˆj instead of the observed
wage yijt on our risk measure r, although we can not directly control for unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity in the hedonic wage regression (because, remember, the risk measure is
regression model is, due to the large number of parameters to be estimated, often difficult to interpret.
9As we will show later, our stratification approach actually reduces the differences between groups of workers
with respect to the observed wage (on this point, see table 5). For example, in the overall sample the difference in
mean monthly earnings between men and women amounts to about 1,700 Swiss francs (about one third relative
to the female average). In the subsample of workers within the lowest skill–level, the difference in average
earnings amounts to only about 630 Swiss francs (relative to the female average, a bit less than 15%). Although
this is only suggestive evidence, we still believe that this exactly what one would expect if the presumption
holds that the variance in θ is lower in the lower skill–levels of jobs.
10Of course, we could capitalize on repeated individual observations using for example the techniques proposed
by Abowd and Kramarz (1999), but as explained in section 3, we only have temporal information about the
employer but not the individual workers.
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not observed over time and because there is no person–identifier in the SWSS).
Thus, in a first stage, we run a simple regression model using the three consecutive waves
of the SWSS:
yijt = α+ x′itβ + z
′
jtγ + λt + ψj + uijt with sij = 4 (6)
Here, again, x and z are vectors of observed individual and firm characteristics and the pa-
rameter λt captures aggregate wage shifts over time. The vector x of observed individual
characteristics is important here because we essentially use x to proxy for otherwise unob-
served individual heterogeneity. Moreover, we run this regression on a subset of individuals
working in jobs with the lowest skill–level only, such that we can further dampen the problem
of unobserved heterogeneity.
The regression model given by equation (6) is only of interest here because it allows us to
estimate the firm wage fixed effects, represented by the vector ψj . Practically, ψj is estimated
from the data by including a separate dummy variable for each firm in the sample.
In the second stage, we run a regression very similar to the hedonic model from equation
(1):
ψˆijk = α+ x′iβ + z
′
jγ + rkδ + uijk with sij = 4 (7)
where now the dependent variable is the estimated firm wage fixed effect ψˆijk of individual i
working in firm j. Note that the unit of observation is still the individual worker, although the
firm fixed effect obviously does not vary between individuals working in the same firm. This
procedure, though, directly applies the right weighting scheme. Again, rk is the non–fatal risk
measure in industry×skill–level cell k. Note that we still have to include both vector x and z,
because the estimated wage firm fixed effect ψˆ is not independent of x and z. The main point
is that the estimated wage firm fixed effect ψˆ should have been separated from the unobserved
individual–specific component θ.
5 Econometric Results
We now present the econometric results, starting with some simple hedonic wage regressions.
We then go to discuss the results from stratifying the sample by skill–level, which yields results
in the expected direction. Next, we present results from our preferred approach, regressing firm
wage fixed–effects instead of individual wage on accident risk. Finally, we present empirical
estimates for the statistical value of a injury (i.e. a non–fatal accident related to workplace
activities), which are implicitly given by the estimates of the different econometric models.
5.1 Hedonic Wage Regression
Estimated parameters of the hedonic wage function, as given by equation (1), are given in
table 2 (column 1). The point estimate of the non–fatal accident risk is negative (-0.00005),
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although statistically not different from zero (t–value of about less than one in absolute value).
This result is in fact in line with either endogenous sorting of workers. Note also that the other
regressors have the expected sign.
Table 2 about here
As discussed in section 4, the leading explanation for the ”wrong” sign of the risk variable is
endogenous sorting of workers into jobs with different risks. As we do not put much confidence
in this simple hedonic wage regression, so we quickly move on to the next results.
5.2 Sample Stratification
Columns 2 to 4 in table 2 also show parameter estimates from a simple hedonic wage regression,
but only for a subset of workers each. As we narrow the range of the skill–level, the point
estimate of risk compensation moves towards the expected direction. Focusing on workers in
the lowest skill–level only yields a positive point estimate on the risk measure (0.00024), which
moreover is almost statistically significant on the 10% level (t–value of 1.63). The decrease
in the R–squared of the model reflects the fact that the stratification of the sample absorbs a
large part of the variation in the regressors (e.g. educational attainment; see section 3), which
otherwise explain a significant part of the variation in wages.
5.3 Wage Firm Fixed Effects
The last column in table A.1 in the chapter appendix shows the estimated firm wage fixed–
effect by industry (at the two–digit level, only for the lowest skill–level of jobs). As shown in
figure 2, a simple scatterplot of the average firm wage fixed–effect (averaged within industries)
versus the number of non–fatal accidents now shows a clear positive relation between the two
variables (as opposed to figure 1, which showed no relation between the two measures at all).
A simple regression of the average wage firm fixed effect on the number of non–fatal accidents
yields an estimated slope coefficient of 0.0034, which marginally reaches statistical significance
(t–value of about 1.6).
Figure 2 about here
Column 1 of table 3 reproduces, for the purpose of comparison, the simple hedonic wage
regression using workers from the lowest skill-level only (see section 5.1 above).
Table 3 about here
As it turns out (see column 2, table 3), the point estimate of the risk parameter more then
doubles when using ψˆ instead of y directly as the dependent variable in the regression, yielding
a point estimate of 0.00067 (with a t–value of more than 2). This result is in line with the
story of workers sorting into jobs based on their (partially) unobserved productivity, because
the main difference between columns 1 and 2 of table 3 is that variation in y still reflects to a
large part variation in unobserved productivity, whereas variation in ψˆ much less so.
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5.4 Detailed Results
We present some additional results for different subgroups of the sample, based on both the
simple hedonic wage model and on models using the wage firm fixed effect as the dependent
variable. The estimates of these additional models are given in table 4. These additional
estimates are consistent with our main result, since in each case the model using the wage
firm fixed effect as the dependent variable yields a higher risk compensation than using the
observed wage. Panel A of table 4 simply reproduces the result from table 3 discussed above
for easy comparison with the other results.
Additionally, these estimates may shed some light on the question of the sorting of workers
into firms with different risk compensation and possibly on differences in risk aversion between
groups of workers.11 Note that, by construction, the estimated firm wage fixed effect ψˆijk is
the same for all individuals working within a specific firm j. It thus must be the case that
differences in the estimated risk compensation between subgroups of workers somehow reflect
differences in risk compensation between firms. We will be more explicit on this point below
when discussing the results.
First, we split the sample by gender (panel B of table 4). The hedonic wage model gives
positive point estimates for both men and women, although both are not statistically different
from zero. Interestingly, the point estimate of the compensating wage differential is larger for
women (δˆ = 0.00046) than for men (δˆ = 0.00015). Using the wage firm fixed effect yields, in
both cases, a higher point estimate than using the observed wage (δˆ = 0.00038 for men, and
δˆ = 0.0015 for women), but now in this case both coefficients are statistically different from
zero. Still, the estimate for women remains about three times as large as the corresponding
estimate for men.
We believe that such a pattern is informative with respect to the underlying sorting of
workers into firms with different risk compensation. The results essentially state that women
ask a higher risk compensation than men for a given change in the statistical non–fatal accident
risk. This result is in line with empirical evidence on differences in risk aversion between men
and women (Sunden and Surette, 1998).
Table 4 about here
Second, table 4 (panel C) also shows separate results for smaller (that is, less than 500
employees) and larger (500 or more employees) firms. The simple hedonic wage regression
for smaller firms gives us a positive and significant point estimate for risk compensation
(δˆ=0.00031, t–value of about 3.3). For larger firms, we find no effect of accident risk on
the firm wage fixed effect (the point estimate is even negative). Moving on to the fixed effects
regression, we again get a larger point estimate for the smaller firms (δˆ = 0.0007, t–value
of about 3.4) and larger firms (δˆ = 0.00055), although for larger firms the estimate remains
statistically insignificant.
11We also split the sample by marital status (i.e. married versus single individuals). We did not find (statis-
tically) different results and we thus do not present these results.
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This result states that smaller firms have to pay higher risk compensation for any increase
in the risk of non–fatal accident than larger firms do. This difference in risk compensation
might reflect underlying differences in the wage setting process between firms of different size.
Specifically, one might argue that wages in smaller firms are more likely to reflect competitive
wages than in larger firms, where rent sharing is presumably more prevalent than in smaller
firms. Another possible explanation for this finding is that workers may perceive working at
larger firms per se as more safe (for whatever reason). In statistical terms, in fact, larger
firms do not pay any risk compensation at all, which possibly means that larger firms have
to guarantee workplace safety anyway because they are presumably under stricter monitoring,
whereas smaller firms have more discretion with respect to workplace safety and thus to risk
compensation.
5.5 The Value of a Statistical Injury
Given an estimate for the compensation for non–fatal accident risk, we can easily compute
the value of a statistical injury (i.e. non–fatal accident). Because all our estimates of the risk
parameter are based on semi–logarithmic regressions, the estimated risk coefficient corresponds
to the relative wage which 1,000 workers are willing to forego in order to prevent one non–fatal
accident (and thus is independent of the time period chosen). Thus, multiplying the estimated
risk parameter by 1,000 yields the estimated relative value of a statistical injury (VSI):
VSI = δˆ · 1, 000 (8)
Since our risk measure refers to non–fatal accident per year, we will phrase the VSI in terms
of average annual earnings (that is, we multiply VSI additionally with the average annual
earnings in the corresponding group of workers). Table 5 shows estimates for the value of a
statistical injury computed from the different estimation methods discussed above (given in
terms of the average annual earnings in the sample). The main estimates are based on the
point estimate of the risk variable. Lower and upper bounds on the value of a statistical injury
are based on the 95% confidence interval of each point estimate of the parameter δ.
Table 5 about here
The simple hedonic wage regression actually yields a negative estimate for the value of a
statistical injury (per injury per year). Only using the upper bound of the confidence interval
yields the expected positive value (although still small).
Stratification of the sample yields a higher value of a statistical injury, the narrower the
sample. Focusing on workers in the lowest skill–level only gives an estimate of about 14,000
Swiss francs (the estimate based on the lower bound of the confidence interval though still
gives a negative estimate).
Using the wage firm fixed effect finally gives a consistent positive value of a statistical
injury (even if we use the lower bound of the corresponding confidence interval). Using the
point estimate, we get an estimated value of a statistical injury of about 40,000 Swiss francs
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per non–fatal accident averted per year. This value fits into the range reported by most other
studies (see Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, again).
6 Conclusions
We provide empirical estimates of the value of a statistical injury for Switzerland for the year
2004, using non–fatal accident risk within industry×skill–level cells and applying different
approaches to identification. Specifically, we try to statistically isolate the firm–specific wage
component, to which the theory of compensating wage differentials conceptually applies most
directly. Further, we try to mitigate the problem of endogenous worker sorting as far as possible
by combining appropriate data and methods.
The empirical method actually makes a huge difference with respect to the estimation of risk
compensation. Simple hedonic wage regressions actually yield negative or zero compensation
for non–fatal accident risk at the workplace. Moving on to methods we believe are more reliable
(i.e. consistent) pushes the risk compensation in the ”right” direction (i.e. yielding positive
compensation for accident risk). Our preferred estimation method, based on a restricted sample
of workers in jobs of lowest skill–level only and using the wage firm fixed effect instead of the
observed wage, gives an estimate for the value of a statistical injury of about 40,000 Swiss
francs, which is within the range given by both studies from inside and outside the U.S. labor
market.
Our analysis, by comparing the magnitude of risk compensation, may also shed some light
on the problem of endogenous sorting of workers based on their (unobserved) productivity–
relevant characteristics. The more attention we pay to mitigating unobserved productivity
differences, the larger the estimates for risk compensation we get. This pattern seems to be
consistent with the hypothesis that high–productivity workers select into lower–risk jobs by
accepting lower wages.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Skill-level 1 Skill-level 1-4
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Monthly wage 4526.63 1069.26 6371.88 3466.72
Natural logarithm of monthly wage 8.39 0.23 8.68 0.38
Non fatal accident risk (per 1,000 workers) 45.40 59.13 93.01 150.42
Age 40.19 11.66 40.71 11.14
Female 0.54 0.50 0.42 0.49
Tenure 7.63 8.18 9.06 9.12
Size of the firm 2714.94 7820.84 3108.01 7890.73
Marital status
Single 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.47
Married 0.62 0.49 0.58 0.49
Others 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30
Education
University degree 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.23
College of higher education 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.21
Higher professional degree 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.26
Teachers’ certificate 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07
High School 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14
Finished professional education 0.27 0.45 0.50 0.50
Firm intern professional education 0.14 0.34 0.07 0.25
Secondary school 0.48 0.50 0.18 0.38
Other degree 0.08 0.28 0.05 0.22
Citizenship
Swiss citizenship 0.52 0.50 0.68 0.47
Short tem residence authorization 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08
Long term residence authorization 0.08 0.28 0.05 0.23
Permanent recidence permit 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.37
Cross-border commuter 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25
Others 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16
Geographic region
VD, VS, GE 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37
BE, FR, SO, NE, JU 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41
BS, BL, AG 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35
ZH 0.24 0.42 0.27 0.44
GL, SH, AR, AI, SG, GR, TG 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32
LU, UR, SZ, OW, NW, ZG 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26
TI 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
Number of Firms 3,533 3,533
Number of Observation 130,976 468,328
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 refer to the subsample of workers in jobs of lowest skill–level, columns 3 and
4 to the full sample of workers. Sources: All variables are taken from the SWSS, except the number
of non–fatal accidents. Risk measure gives the number of non–fatal accidents per 1,000 workers per
year, within cells over industry×skill–level. Own calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF
(2004).
20
T
ab
le
2:
H
ed
on
ic
w
ag
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
by
sk
ill
–l
ev
el
of
jo
b
ln
(m
on
th
ly
w
ag
e)
(y
)
Sk
ill
–l
ev
el
(s
)
of
jo
b
1–
4
2–
4
3–
4
4
N
on
fa
ta
l
ac
ci
de
nt
ri
sk
−0
.0
00
05
−0
.0
00
03
0.
00
00
1
0.
00
02
4
(−
0.
88
)
(−
0.
60
)
(0
.3
0)
(1
.6
3)
(P
la
nt
si
ze
/
10
0)
0.
00
19
3?
?
0.
00
17
9?
?
0.
00
17
5?
?
0.
00
14
8?
(2
.9
2)
(2
.9
8)
(2
.7
7)
(2
.1
6)
(P
la
nt
si
ze
/
10
0)
sq
ua
re
d
−0
.0
00
01
?
?
−0
.0
00
01
?
?
?
−0
.0
00
01
?
?
−0
.0
00
00
?
(−
3.
49
)
(−
3.
60
)
(−
3.
31
)
(−
2.
12
)
A
ge
0.
03
29
9?
?
?
0.
03
32
9?
?
?
0.
03
02
8?
?
?
0.
01
73
3?
?
?
(1
7.
36
)
(1
7.
10
)
(1
5.
80
)
(9
.6
1)
A
ge
sq
ua
re
d
−0
.0
00
34
?
?
?
−0
.0
00
35
?
?
?
−0
.0
00
32
?
?
?
−0
.0
00
19
?
?
?
(−
18
.2
3)
(−
17
.7
0)
(−
16
.2
7)
(−
9.
18
)
(T
en
ur
e
/
10
)
0.
07
16
1?
?
?
0.
07
18
9?
?
?
0.
07
91
0?
?
?
0.
11
26
1?
?
?
(5
.0
6)
(5
.1
3)
(5
.6
3)
(6
.6
5)
(T
en
ur
e
/
10
)
sq
ua
re
d
−0
.0
08
34
?
−0
.0
08
07
?
−0
.0
08
73
?
−0
.0
17
67
?
?
?
(−
2.
40
)
(−
2.
37
)
(−
2.
64
)
(−
4.
19
)
C
on
st
an
t
8.
91
11
8?
?
?
8.
70
65
7?
?
?
8.
59
13
8?
?
?
8.
67
28
6?
?
?
(1
21
.6
2)
(1
19
.7
1)
(1
20
.2
4)
(5
0.
83
)
n
46
8,
32
8
44
1,
26
9
34
6,
91
6
13
0,
97
6
R
2
0.
62
3
0.
55
6
0.
45
9
0.
32
1
N
o
te
s:
?
,
?
?
,
?
?
?
d
en
o
te
s
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
o
n
th
e
5
%
,
1
%
a
n
d
0
.1
%
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
R
o
b
u
st
t–
va
lu
es
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
S
k
il
l–
le
v
el
1
(4
)
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
s
to
th
e
h
ig
h
es
t
(l
ow
es
t)
sk
il
l–
le
v
el
p
o
ss
ib
le
.
21
Table 3: Observed wage versus wage firm fixed effect (skill–level 4 only)
ln(monthly wage)
Observed wage (y) Firm fixed effect (ψˆ)
Non fatal accident risk 0.00024 0.00067?
(1.63) (2.41)
(Plant size / 100) 0.00148? 0.00189?
(2.16) (2.10)
(Plant size / 100) squared −0.00000? −0.00000
(−2.12) (−1.63)
Age 0.01733??? 0.00437?
(9.61) (2.49)
Age squared −0.00019??? −0.00005?
(−9.18) (−2.68)
(Tenure / 10) 0.11261??? 0.03799??
(6.65) (2.80)
(Tenure / 10) squared −0.01767??? −0.00793?
(−4.19) (−2.42)
Constant 8.67286??? −0.08190
(50.83) (−1.31)
n 130,976 130,976
R2 0.321 0.201
Notes: ?, ??, ??? denotes statistical significance on the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level,
respectively. Robust t–values in parentheses. Only workers in jobs of lowest
skill–level. Own calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF (2004).
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Table 4: Wage firm fixed effects, detailed results
Log–Wage Firm fixed effect
A. Overall sample 0.00024 0.00067?
(1.63) (2.41)
n 130,976 130,976
R2 0.321 0.201
B. By gender
Men 0.00015 0.00038???
(0.96) (3.81)
n 60,219 60,219
R2 0.304 0.192
Women 0.00046 0.00150?
(1.34) (2.61)
n 70,757 70,757
R2 0.240 0.270
C. By size of firm
Smaller firms 0.00031?? 0.00070??
(3.29) (3.36)
n 75,911 75,911
R2 0.293 0.185
Larger firms −0.00001 0.00055
(−0.02) (1.09)
n 55,065 55,065
R2 0.395 0.243
Notes: ?, ??, ??? denotes statistical significance on the 5%, 1%
and 0.1% level, respectively. Robust t–values in parentheses.
Own calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF (2004).
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Figures
Figure 1: Log–Wage versus non–fatal injury risk, by industry
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Non fatal accidents for 1,000 workers
beta = −.0001 ; t−value = −.4
Notes: The y–axis shows the average logarithm of monthly gross earnings and the
number of non–fatal accidents per 1,000 workers per year. Workers in lowest job
skill–level only. Table A.1 in the chapter appendix shows the corresponding numbers.
Own calculations, based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF (2004).
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Figure 2: Firm fixed effect versus non–fatal injury risk, by industry
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Non fatal accidents for 1,000 workers
beta = .0034 ; t−value = 1.6
Notes: The y–axis shows the average of the wage firm fixed effect and the x–axis
the number of non–fatal accidents per 1,000 workers per year. Workers in lowest
job skill–level only. Also see table A.1 in the chapter appendix. Own calculations,
based on SWSS (2004) and SAIF (2004).
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Main variables, by industry (lowest skill–level only)
Industry Workers Earnings Accidents FFE
Petroleum refining and processing 4692 5,560.13 0.14 0.78
Office material production, data processing 4288 4,302.83 0.59 -0.62
Information technology services 6237 3,933.30 2.39 -0.76
Shipping 55 5,467.47 3.57 0.96
Metal production and processing 7201 4,781.81 5.46 -0.53
Aviation 12 5,496.25 6.22 -0.44
Production of leather goods and shoes 229 3,628.01 8.94 -1.57
Production of clothes and fur goods 270 3,741.27 9.89 -1.87
Insurance industry 2086 5,300.57 10.53 1.38
Production of medical technology 7421 4,523.07 11.55 -0.26
Retail business 19118 4,090.10 12.26 -0.22
Tobacco processing 636 5,977.87 12.70 3.61
Production of furniture, jewellery, musical intruments 1743 4,329.91 14.86 -0.27
Machinery/mechanical engineering 5441 4,851.64 20.24 -0.07
Textiles 1350 4,436.00 20.83 -0.73
Automobile industry 1075 4,508.15 22.73 -0.39
Energy– and watersupply 496 5,504.46 25.59 1.79
Traffic support 1502 4,360.78 26.35 -0.53
Credit business 3059 5,833.48 28.60 0.91
Paper and carton production 2153 4,917.06 29.64 -0.22
Credit business and insurance industry 70 5,373.94 29.76 0.86
Printing, publishing and distribution industries 3013 4,833.14 36.99 -0.21
Research and development 202 5,478.94 39.78 1.34
Whole sale 7621 4,683.02 41.36 -0.34
Wood processing 810 4,950.09 43.53 0.11
Transportation 2236 4,724.08 46.89 -0.29
Rubber and plastic production 2657 4,511.65 48.12 -0.60
Mining 80 5,277.08 50.33 2.03
Agriculture 6756 4,310.73 57.05 -0.96
Mining 1217 4,821.76 59.91 -0.26
Health and welfare system 19642 4,582.02 65.31 0.92
Hotel and restaurant industry 9676 3,743.90 76.98 -0.01
Real estate 581 4,784.07 95.10 0.69
Information transmission 55 4,707.71 111.04 0.05
Entertainment 814 4,208.07 113.46 -0.44
Education 744 4,394.47 221.19 0.64
Personal services 238 4,318.43 233.62 2.31
Waste management 95 4,953.19 242.00 0.37
Lobby, associations, organizations 512 5,067.35 264.88 1.22
Construction 4893 4,965.64 289.03 0.25
Notes: Table entries show sample averages within industries. Non–fatal accident risk is the number of
non–fatal accidents per 1,000 workers. Wage is the average logarithm of gross monthly earnings. Wage
firm fixed effect is the average firm fixed effect, as given by equation (6), and is (in the table) standardized
to mean 0 and variance 1. Own calculations, based on SWSS and SIAF.
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